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"NEITHER FORCE NOR WILL"
L.H. LaRue*
If we are to choose which provision of the constitution has
turned out to be the stupidest, we must be allowed to use hindsight. In the beginning, there were provisions that made good
sense in their day, but time has been hard on them. With the use
of hindsight, I choose the second sentence of Section 1 of Article
III: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good behaviour.... "
Perhaps there are others who, like me, find the phrase "during good behaviour" to be highly ambiguous. And some of these
may even join me in finding the standard interpretation of that
phrase rather strange. But I waive all such matters, and I am
willing to go forward on the assumption that a community consensus has settled the meaning of the phrase, which is, that our
judges shall serve for life, unless they choose to resign, or unless
they are impeached. Having accepted that "good behaviour"
means "life tenure," I will say that this provision is stupid.
However, I admit that this judgment does draw heavily upon
the use of hindsight, and I do not wish to impugn the judgment of
the drafters. When they wrote, the project of constitution-making was new, and the relevant experience was lacking. Having an
independent judiciary was more theory than reality for them, and
they had not experienced a regime in which judges declared governmental acts to be unconstitutional. Of course, judicial review
was not foreign to them; they were familiar with the precedents
and approved of the concept. Even so, it was not a lived reality.
In setting up this new and powerful institution, they had to proceed upon assumptions, and it is not strange that some of these
assumptions might tum out to be false.
Consider, for example, Hamilton's famous discussion of the
judiciary in Federalist No. 78. Recall that the context for this discussion is whether the judiciary would have the capacity to upset
the political balance of power.
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Whoever attentively considers the different departments
of power must perceive that, in a government in which they
are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature
of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only
dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community.
The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to
be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no intluence
over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or the wealth of the society, and can take no active
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither
FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy
of its judgments.

When I read this passage, I am always charmed by the elegance of such classic eighteenth century prose, and it always
takes me a little while to cast off the spell and descend to the ugly
task of analysis. When I do, my first reaction is, "How quaint!"
And indeed, analysis seems almost beside the point. To be
charmed by the antique quality of this paragraph is perhaps the
only appropriate response; Hamilton's world seems so far removed from ours that it is otiose to assess his description of the
judiciary as though it were a description of our judiciary. Consider, by way of a parallel, his description of the President as dispensing honors and holding the sword and his description of
Congress as commanding the purse and prescribing rules. There
is an antique charm to this description, but it would be both
churlish and irrelevant to dissect it, to test its accuracy as political
science. (Today, I suppose that one would start with the role of
money and the mass media in politics, and go forward from that
starting point, if one wished to talk about "the political rights of
the Constitution.")
We should not be surprised, of course, that we differ from
Hamilton in our most fundamental assumptions about government and law, but perhaps it may be worthwhile to emphasize
that we do indeed differ from him in how we understand judging.
For example, I do not think that many (any?) scholars would say
today that judging does not involve "force or will." Hamilton
was confident that he could draw a line between political will and
judicial judgment; I think that most of us are not quick to assume
that this can be done.
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Perhaps one way to highlight the difference between Hamilton's assumptions and ours is to look at his description of the
"job qualifications" for a judge, which appear somewhat later in
Federalist No. 78.
There is yet a further and weighty reason for the permanency of the judicial offices which is deducible from the nature
of the qualifications they require. It has frequently been remarked with great propriety that a voluminous code of laws is
one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound
down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them; and it will be readily conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind that the records of those precedents must unavoidably
swell to a very considerable bulk and must demand long and
laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them.
Hence it is that there can be but few men in the society who
will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the
stations of judges. And making the proper deductions for the
ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still
smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge.

We have, in recent years, witnessed some rather interesting
controversies over judicial appointments, and I trust it takes no
citation to remind everyone that the participants in the debates
differed sharply about "qualifications." Your memory may differ
from mine, but I do not recall anyone arguing that a deep, scholarly knowledge of the precedents was the fundamental prerequisite for the job. Why not? Because none of us believes that our
judges are "bound down by strict rules and precedents which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case
that comes before them." None of us believes that Hamilton has
correctly described the type of judiciary, the type of judges, that
we live with today. Of course, it would be foolish to criticize
Hamilton for failing to be a prophet on this point. But I do feel
free to criticize those among us who refuse to wake up and see
that our reality is different.
Let us proceed then from assumptions that match our day:
(1) we have a strong and independent judiciary;
(2) our judges have the power to change the law, both common law and constitutional law;
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(3) our judges will exercise their power to change the law
based upon their judgments about justice and utility;
( 4) this power to change the law is not unlimited, since
there are political, institutional, and moral restraints that all
judges feel;
(5) this power has been used in the past sometimes for the
good, sometimes for the bad;
(6) we ought to accept and continue this power, but we
should also limit it.
If you grant these assumptions, then the question arises:
should we give these judges, especially those who sit on the
Supreme Court, life tenure? Not I. I would limit their tenure.
For example, one might guarantee life tenure as a judge, but limit
the period for which a judge might serve on any one court. Perhaps a Supreme Court Justice should serve on that court for only
ten or fifteen years, and then move down to a lower court. I pick
a term of about that length because I think that most Supreme
Court Justices do their best work during the period of their fifth
to tenth years. As a rough generalization, I would say that it is
uphill to that plateau, and then downhill afterwards. By downhill, I don't mean that they tend to become senile. Instead, they
just run out of new ideas; after their tenth year, almost all judges
start defending what they did in their early career, and consequently, it would be good for them to move on. Any argument
over details of my proposal, however, would be idle, unless there
is agreement on fundamental principle.
Is there agreement on fundamental principle? At this point,
I should be launching into a review of the possible arguments,
pro and con. And were I really clever, I could use this dialectic
of pro and con to generate the requisite fundamental principles
by which we could assess whether changing Article III, Section 1,
sentence 2, would be a good idea. But my imagination fails me. I
simply can't imagine why anyone would argue that a judge
should have life tenure on the Supreme Court. My imagination
is not that good.

